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The Dynamic Capabilities Framework, originally developed to enhance understanding of
strategic agility in high-tech firms operating in high-velocity markets, is shown to be
relevant for the Upstream Oil and Gas sector, in the context of five industry game-
changers. Here operational and general managers with key strategic decision-making re-
sponsibilities significant challenges created by increased demand for energy resources,
new technologies that have opened unconventional plays, increased competition, shrink-
ing global geoscience and engineering talent pools, and the reality and perception of
environmental risks. The Dynamic Capabilities Framework is distinguished from other
“textbook” strategic methodologies and is applied to today’s upstream strategic context
and inflection point. Dynamic capabilities join with strategy to empower an organization’s
ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address
rapidly changing markets. Dynamic capabilities differ from ordinary capabilities in that
they orchestrate clusters of ordinary capabilities, best practices and competencies to gain
competitive and performance advantages e capturing opportunities and managing stra-
tegic risks. Three dynamic capabilities are described that have particular importance for
upstream oil and gas companies in the new business environment: (1) ambidexterity across
mature and emerging domains; (2) the ability to manage the upstream business ecosystem;
and (3) the ability to manage Health, Safety, Security and Environmental (HSSE) consid-
erations in the multinational corporation and throughout the business ecosystem.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND li-
cense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
The Dynamic Capabilities Framework was developed to enhance
strategic agility in high-tech firms operating in high-velocity markets. A
dynamic capability is a meta-process that orchestrates a number of
processes, and goes beyondbest practices tomanage the firm’s strategic
imperatives. For businesses in high-velocitymarkets, strategizing cannot
be long-term because market and technological uncertainty require
constant refocusing for the firm to remain relevant. Leaders create
competitive advantage by rapidly transforming their companies with
dynamic capabilities that support technological, organizational, opera-
tional, and business model innovations.lifornia at Berkeley, Berkeley,
).
d. This is an open access article undToday, the Dynamic Capabilities Framework is being used to capture
opportunities and mitigate strategic risks in Upstream Oil and Gas
Exploration and Production (E&P). Operational and general managers
with key strategic decision-making responsibilities employ it to main-
tain sustainable value, to enhance safety and profitably, to increase
reserves and production to meet the company’s share of the world’s
energy needs, and to maintain or advance the company’s competitive
position. This paper describes how the Dynamic Capabilities Frame-
work can be adapted and employed to capture opportunities and meet
the considerable challenges created by recent changes in the industry.11 Editor’s note: A case study titled “Dynamic Capability and Supermajor EXP,” pub-
lished elsewhere in this issue of Energy Strategy Review, provides details as to how the
capabilities approach was used by one E&P firm to enhance its competitive position and
financial performance.
er the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
A. Shuen et al. / Energy Strategy Reviews 3 (2014) 5e136To explore the contribution of the Dynamic Capabilities Framework
for E&P strategy, we:
a. Describe the weaknesses of textbook strategic methodologies for
Upstream Strategy.
b. Explicate the Dynamic Capabilities Framework.
c. Describe how new opportunities and challenges within the up-
stream industry have created an inflection point that requires a
transformative approach to strategy and strategic management.
While demand for energy resources continues to increase, new
technologies have opened unconventional plays and increased
competition. Meanwhile, global geoscience and engineering talent
pools have shrunk, and the reality and perception of environ-
mental risk has increased for industry participants.
d. Demonstrate how the Dynamic Capabilities Framework is relevant
to today’s upstream strategic context.
e. Describe how three specific dynamic capabilities empower up-
stream strategic imperatives
While we believe that the Dynamic Capabilities Framework is
relevant for strategic management in each of the three sectors of the
oil and gas industry e upstream, midstream and downstream e and
throughout the petroleum industry as a whole, our focus here is on
upstream. As this paper demonstrates, the need to create value and
increase production, the very considerable economic potential created
by new exploration opportunities, and the complexity of the challenges
facing upstream strategists and managers require a new and more
effective approach to strategic oversight and execution. To survive and
prosper in this totally transformed business environment, firms need to
develop and employ strong dynamic capabilities.
2. The weaknesses of textbook strategic methodologies for
upstream strategy
While E&P companies might benefit from applying traditional stra-
tegic management frameworks to navigate the tricky currents of the
business environment described below (Section 4), this section explains
why several prominent and commonly used analytical tools/frame-
works fail to provide both the deep insight into the dilemmas that
producers face today and the strategic guidance producers need to
address them.
2.1. Porter’s five forces
Michael Porter [1] developed his approach partly in reaction to the
Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) paradigm,
which he considered “unrigorous and ad hoc”. According to Porter,
strategic managers should focus on five forces: three from horizontal
competition (1) the threat of substitute products or services; (2) the
threat of established rivals; (3) the threat of new entrants; and two
factors from vertical competition: (4) the bargaining power of suppliers
and (5) the bargaining power of customers. His emphasis is on assessing
the industry and, in particular, on avoiding product markets that are
perfectly competitive, where firms can only earn rates of return suf-
ficient to cover the costs of capital. The game (strategy) in Porter’s
framework is to find a way to shield oneself from the cold winds of
competition so as to have a shot at making higher than competitive
returns and earning more than the cost of capital.
While the framework is popular, and does provide some overall
guidance for assessing developments inside and outside an industry, its
usefulness for E&P firms is limited. First, Porter ignores the business
ecosystem and “the presence of complementors,” which is central to
E&P strategy (joint ventures and other strategic and contractual re-
lationships). Second, the role of governments and pressure groups is
omitted, which is also important. Third, Porter provides no assistanceto strategic managers with respect to how they should compete and
how they should manage their asset base to compete better. Fourth, it
is difficult to evaluate a particular strategic opportunity without
analyzing the resources a particular firm brings to that opportunity.
The five forces framework will give incumbents pause for concern
about entry into shale gas and oil ventures, and might suggest an
acquisition strategy of both reserves and operators who are already
fracking. It will not bring into focus the fact that the large incumbents
may lack capabilities or resources to execute high potential investment
opportunities.
2.2. Distinctive competencies
In order to explain long run superior performance, some scholars
have focused on what they call “distinctive competences” [2e4]. A key
foundation for distinctive competence is top management itself. Top
management sets strategy, shapes culture, and makes the key resource
allocation decisions. The framework underscores the importance of
quality management, but without specifying the desirable traits of top
management and what leaders are supposed to do, other than adhere
to a good long-run vision [5], be good leaders [6] and be change agents
effectuating transformation [7].
A single-minded emphasis on the role of management as an expla-
nation for superior performance ignores a variety of other factors
important for understanding longer run firm performance. The firmmay
be lacking key assets, may have a poor balance sheet, and may be
ossified in its decision making. Its not just the quality of management;
it is the assets (tangible and intangible) that managers get to (or choose
to) manage, both inside the firm and external to it.
2.3. Resource-based-view (RBV)
The resource-based view (RBV) maintains that a firm’s competitive
advantage lies in its ability to utilize a cluster of available intangible
and tangible resources [8e10]. These resources are difficult to imitate
by competitors and thereby create sustainable value. They should be
valuable (V), rare (R), inimitable (I) and non-substitutable (N). Pro-
tecting and managing these resources engenders good performance
[11,12].
The RVB applied properly, will generally suggest that an E&P firm’s
intangible assets, not its reserve base (be that oil, gas, coal, or key
wind turbine locations), are more determinative of its long-term
financial performance. A proper focus on intangibles (technical know-
how, organizational capabilities, including management itself) is
likely to be most helpful. This view supports the old adage that oil (and
gas) is found “in the mind; not in the ground.”
In 2001, under criticism from Priem and Butler, Barney admitted
that the VRIN framework applied only to static environments, not dy-
namic ones, which are characterized by high velocity and rapid change
[13]. The Dynamic Capabilities Framework can then be seen as a
further elaboration of the RVB, reengineering it for the complex,
rapidly changing markets that most businesses face today.
3. The dynamic capabilities framework
As defined by Teece, Pisano and Shuen [14,15], dynamic capabilities
are “the ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and
external competencies to address rapidly changing markets.” The Dy-
namic Capabilities Framework took shape during the 1990s [14,16]. It
has attracted interest as a potentially overarching paradigm for the
field of strategic management. It also implicitly propounds a new
theory of the firm and of firm-level competitive advantage.
“Dynamic Capabilities” focus not on an organization’s intentions,
motivations, or strategy, although strategy may be implicated; rather
they focus on what the organization can actually accomplish.
A. Shuen et al. / Energy Strategy Reviews 3 (2014) 5e13 7Capabilities arise from past activities and are shaped in part by
managerial decisions; such decisions create, mold, and deploy capa-
bilities [17].
Strong dynamic capabilities are unlikely, on their own, to result in
competitive advantage. As discussed below, strategy must be matched
to capabilities in order to predict when and how dynamic capabilities
will impact the firm’s performance. Strong dynamic capabilities and
good strategy have combined to sustain competitive advantage in firms
that have endured for decades, even as they shifted the focus of their
activities.
In the earlier versions of dynamic capabilities [14], three processes
are recognized as core to dynamic capabilities: (1) coordinating/inte-
grating, (2) learning, and (3) reconfiguration. Integration and coordi-
nation routines involve combining resources, such as with the new
product development process. Learning is an outcome of practice and
experimentation and allows tasks to be performed effectively.
Reconfiguration refers to transformation, which in turn requires
recombination of existing resources. In Teece [15], “asset orchestra-
tion” is identified as a meta-process that envelops and engages all
three processes.
Only business processes and business models that yield value-
enhancing differentiation constitute genuine dynamic capabilities.
Such processes are usually quite unique and firm specific and may be
thought of as “signature processes” or “signature business models.”
These arise from the firm’s organizational heritage and so are difficult
for competitors to imitate. In order to make dynamic capabilities more
operational, Teece [15] identifies three types of “orchestration” pro-
cesses/activities: sensing, seizing and transforming (for a description
of these processes, see Feiler and Teece: Case Study, in this issue).
An understanding of dynamic capabilities can be sharpened by
comparing them with ordinary capabilities. Ordinary capabilities
permit sufficiency (and occasionally excellence) in the performance of
a well-delineated task. They generally fall into three categories:
administration, operations and governance. Ordinary capabilities are
embedded in some combination of: (1) skilled personnel, including,
under certain circumstances, independent contractors; (2) facilities
and equipment; and (3) processes and routines, including any sup-
porting technical manuals and the administrative coordination needed
to get the job done. Strong ordinary capabilities indicate that the firm
has achieved “best practices,” and owns or has access to skilled people
and advanced equipment.
Ordinary capabilities are usually in the public domain; hence, they
can be “bought.” Best practices are in this sense ordinary. Best prac-
tices, however, may be difficult or costly to outsource since they are
often the result of learning, economies of scope and absorptive ca-
pacity. Additionally, even ordinary capabilities may be difficult for a
given firm to achieve on its own without the benefit of the right envi-
ronment, talent, resources, core and complementary assets. Whether
bought or developed internally, best operational practices are those
that increase speed, quality and efficiency. Best practices can be
thought of as those that “continuously collect and analyze performance
information, that set challenging and interlinked short- and long-runTable 1
Dynamic versus ordinary capabilities.
Ordinary capabilities
Purpose Technical efficiency in business functi
Tripartite schema Operations, administration, and gover
Capability-level goal Best practice
Priority Doing things right
Imitability Relatively imitable
Mechanisms of attainability Buy or build
Result Technical fitnesstargets, and that reward high performers and retrain/fire low per-
formers” [18]. Eisenhardt and Martin [19] have provided details of the
routines and processes that undergird such ordinary capabilities.
Strong ordinary capabilities are built on best practices; dynamic
capabilities are built on signature practices and employ differentiated
business models. Signature practices arise from a company’s heritage
and business models, including its prior management actions and
context-specific learning [20].
The essence of dynamic capabilities is that they cannot generally be
bought (apart from acquiring the entire organization); they must be
built. They are often highly context specific. The growth and potential
transformation of the enterprise envisioned when an enterprise has
strong dynamic capabilities go beyond the notion of “strategic fit.”
Table 1summarizes basic distinction between ordinary and dynamic
capabilities.
As already noted, dynamic capabilities, although essential for
creating sustainable competitive advantage, must still be used in aid
of, and in conjunction with, a good strategy in order to be effective.
Strategy, capabilities and the business environment coevolve. None-
theless, a strategy that is consistent, coherent and accommodating of
innovation is needed to help achieve competitive advantage. A firm
with strong dynamic capabilities is able to flesh out the details around
strategic intent and to implement strategic actions quickly and effec-
tively. Hence, dynamic capabilities and business strategy co-determine
firm performance.
The dynamic capabilities framework emphasizes the need to look
beyond ensuring that a business runs smoothly. The latter constitutes
technical efficiency, which is relatively easy to achieve. The ability to
dynamically formulate and execute strategy, achieve alignment with
markets and shape them where possible is the essential requirement
for durable enterprise growth and profitability. Managers at all levels
must look around and ahead to detect and respond to opportunities and
threats. Strong dynamic capabilities allow an organization or business
unit not only to do things right but also to do the right things (i.e. what
is necessary to become and stay competitive).
Dynamic capabilities reside, in part, with individual managers and
the top management team and, in part, with superordinate values and
routines that enable an enterprise to perform beyond best practice. At
certain key junctures, the ability of a CEO and the top management
team to recognize a key development or trend, then delineate a
response and guide the firm in co-creation and co-development activ-
ities, may be the most important element of the firm’s dynamic ca-
pabilities. But the organization’s values, culture, and its collective
ability to quickly implement a new business model or other changes are
also integral to the strength or weakness of the firm’s dynamic
capabilities.
4. A perfect storm of industry game changers
We believe that the Dynamic Capabilities Framework provides the
leaders of upstream firms a method to effectively and efficiently
capture opportunities, create value, and mitigate risks amid theDynamic capabilities
ons Achieving congruence with and with technological and
business opportunities and customer needs
nance Sensing, seizing, and transforming
Signature process




A. Shuen et al. / Energy Strategy Reviews 3 (2014) 5e138challenges created by a “perfect storm” of industry game-changers
that together constitute a “strategic inflection point” [21]. At least
five factors have triggered a climacteric for upstream entities; some
have been building for decades, others are very recent. Only the
confluence of several factors could bring about such a “perfect storm”
of upheaval that has strategic implications for all producers e the
national oil and gas companies, the supermajors, and the
independents.
4.1. Increasing demand for oil and gas requires significantly
increased production
Economists and strategists in most oil and gas companies regularly
develop energy consumption scenarios. These provide projections on
energy demand, over a 25e50 year period, broken down by resource
(oil, gas, coal, nuclear, renewables, etc.). Most show a consistent
pattern:
 Between 2000e2050, total worldwide energy consumption doubles
 Oil and gas production increases to meet demand through 2040,
when production levels off and demand is increasingly met by
biomass and other renewables.
 A significant portion of the increased demand originates from
developing countries.
 A rampant worldwide urbanization is occurring, which will move
the world’s urban population well above the current 50%; this is
likely to shape and increase future energy needs.
One measure investors use to judge the operating performance of
an E&P company is the Reserve Replacement Ratio (RRR).2 The RRR
measures the amount of proved reserves added to a company’s reserve
base during a given year relative to the amount of oil and gas produced.
To sustain 2% production growth requires a 118% RRR. Most majors
target year-over-year production growth over 3%. They envision
continuing at that level or more each year for the next two decades to
meet their share of the energy demand allocated to oil and gas.
However, in 2012, the two largest American oil companies, Exxon and
Chevron, reported RRRs of 115% and 112% respectively, while European
competitors reported somewhat concerning RRRs: BP (77%); Shell (85%)
and Total (93%).
Generally, two options are open to oil and gas companies to in-
crease their reserves: (1) increase reserves through acquisition stra-
tegies; purchasing proven reserves; (2) increase reserves through
organic strategies, including partnerships (joint ventures), which
support the continued discovery of new resources.3
 Acquisition strategies. 2012 saw a wave of Oil and Gas acquisition
activity in the U.S., Russia and Canada: $254B was spent on 679
deals, with approximately 33% of these driven by Unconventionals
[22,23]. Purchasing proven reserves, however, does nothing to
increase global production to meet increased demand; it simply
shifts production to the acquirer.4
 Partnering and organic growth strategies. Most companies pro-
duce new organic discoveries with risk sharing partners (partial
asset swaps). In 2012, joint ventures were omnipresent: Chevron
with Argentina’s state-run company; BP with Russia; Shell with2 RRR is a common proxy for value creation in the IOCs. Another proxy is market
value. Adding to the changing landscape is the emergence of new IOC business models
that do not necessarily boost RRR but do generate profits. Service contracts between
some IOCs and Iraq are examples [24].
3 Diversification into biomass and other renewables is becoming an important part of
value creation for the majors and NOCs, but is normally managed strategically and
organizationally apart from upstream E&P operations.
4 Analysts value RRR resulting from organic growth higher than RRR that is purchased.national oil companies that own interests in the Arctic; Total in
Africa; and Exxon everywhere. Most majors have embarked on
opening new frontiers in challenging locations (e.g., the Arctic).
They compete with the independents in the niche basins, where
securing the best positions in those basins makes the venture
economically feasible. They are also deploying new technologies
to rejuvenate heartlands that were previously deemed depleted;
while also pursing unconventional plays.
To expand reserves, either through acquisitions or organically,
managers must focus attention on certain clusters of activity, what we
call, Dynamic Capabilities. When well developed, these address a
range of exigencies: the rapid integration of acquisitions; the ongoing
management of joint ventures, not only to realize production targets,
but also achieve efficiencies, quality and safety; the ability to more
effectively predict volumes and the subsurface reality (risk); the rapid
deployment of technology and people into potentially hostile envi-
ronments; and the requirement of ubiquitous change, and associated
learning, throughout the organization.
4.2. Unconventionals: new technologies, new geographies, new
processes, new opportunity and the need for ubiquitous learning
Given the increasing scarcity of relatively cheap conventional hy-
drocarbons, upstream companies are investing in Unconventional oil
and gas to grow reserves and production (RRR). Unconventional oper-
ations focus on shale plays which yield natural gas, NGLs, gas con-
densates, and crude oil. Tight gas, coal bed methane, oil sands, and
heavy oil are non-shale Unconventional resources. The move toward
Unconventionals requires the development and application of new
technologies and new processes in new geographies. With Unconven-
tional plays, managers confront both great opportunity and consider-
able challenge. This requires organizational change, learning and a
different set of managerial priorities.
The development and application of cost effective fracking tech-
nologies, beginning first in the U.S., is a monumental game changer. In
the last 15 years, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking have made
large quantities of tight shale gas and oil reserves viable. Today over
60% of all new oil and gas wells are hydraulically fractured [25],
employing over 2.5 million people worldwide, approximately 1 million
in the US [26]. US domestic gas reserves have tripled; China’s by an
order of magnitude. The International Energy Agency [26] has pro-
jected that due to the recent tight oil boom, the US will surpass Saudi
Arabia and Russia to become the world’s largest oil producer by
2017e2020.
About 30% of US oil production is extracted today from tight oil
formations. Production of gas and associated natural gas liquids has
already begun to surge, reducing net imports of oil and gas. This
development is likely to transform the US to a net exporter of oil and
gas within the decade. It is also leading to greater dispersion in the
distribution of viable energy reserves, to include nations as disparate as
China and Poland.
Increased North American LNG exports create complexity and
disruptive change for the LNG industry, resulting in either epic oppor-
tunities or strategic risks to revenue and profit that could threaten all
industry participants. Goncalves [27] raises the critical questions:
 How much demand growth and LNG exports can North American
shale production sustain at reasonably low prices e and how much
will regional natural gas prices increase due to the LNG exports?
 If North American LNG exports grow rapidly, how will competing
foreign LNG producers fare and will global demand grow rapidly
enough to absorb the extra supply?
 Ultimately, to what extent and how fast will these trends reduce
global LNG prices and impact “shale spreads” e and will this occur
Fig. 1. The increasing diversity of oil and gas “plays”.
A. Shuen et al. / Energy Strategy Reviews 3 (2014) 5e13 9through softened oil-indexation or perhaps the partial or full
elimination of oil indexation in favor of greater use of natural gas
or LNG hub pricing.
The answers to these questions drive the profitability, or losses, of
major LNG suppliers and traders as well as major LNG importers,
buyers, and national gas suppliers (Fig. 1).5
The economic vagaries of Unconventional resources challenge
conventional methodologies for investment decision-making. While
extraction of hydrocarbons from shale is technically viable, economic
viability remains problematic [28e30]. Several industry cases have
shown economic and financial viability (e.g., EOG Resources), however,
successes occur predominantly with agile, first-moving independents,
compared to IOCs [31,32].
The challenges of managing unconventional production deepen
with the following list of considerations:
 Oil and gas companies must manage both the technical difficulties
of drilling in new geological formations, and the non-technical
risks related to adverse media attention, public criticism and
increasing governmental regulation concerning the environmental
effects of fracking. These include the migration of gases and
fracturing chemicals to the surface, contamination from spills,
depletion of fresh water, earthquakes, water contamination,
noise, and air pollution. Some governments have barred fracking
operations, after oil and gas companies have made significant
investments. In response, new treaties involving Canada, the EU
and the US have come into force, which allow private investors to
sue governments when operations are curtailed [33e35]; howev-
er, these agreements are not in place in many high-potential lo-
cations around the world.
 The amount of oil and gas capable of being extracted given current
technologies is significantly less than the amount of oil and gas
present in the shale, increasing the uncertainty of predictions
related to the volumes that could potentially be added to reserves,
potentially impacting the profitability of such projects, and lead-
ing to uncertainty about future pricing.
 Unconventional wells are depleted more rapidly than conventional
wells, challenging traditional calculations related to the long-term
ROI of leases, transportation and logistical support.
 In many locations shortages of drilling rigs create significant de-
lays. In some locations, this has recently been abated by the5 Fig. 1 is a diagrammatic modification of data presented in Fig. 17, New Technolo-
gies, attributed source: Energy Intelligence North Sea Market Review 2012, p. 63, in V.
Marcel, Chapter 6, “Finding the Right Partners for National Oil Companies,” in V. Marcel
and B. Mitchell. Chatham House Report. What’s Next for the Oil & Gas Industry (Oct.
2012), The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, UK.implementation of new mobile rigs (“pad” technology), which
essentially double the number of wells a particular rig can drill per
year [36,37]. The new rigs are expensive and tend to create a
competitive advantage for the larger players, who can afford
them.
 Large oil and gas companies with capabilities sharpened to capture
value from mega-projects need to reconfigure their resources and
processes for fracking operations, which involve numerous wells in
a single field and other logistical challenges.
 Those working on Unconventional Ventures need to traverse a
steep learning curve before achieving process efficiencies.
The cluster of activities that must be managed is extensive and
often overwhelming, particularly given: the number of wells that
must be drilled as compared to conventional operations; the fact
that many Unconventional projects are understaffed; the technical
complexity of fracking and horizontal drilling; delays related to the
supply of rigs and parts; environmental considerations; team and
managerial inexperience; the need to coordinate and assure the
quality of the work of contractors and vendors; the distance or
inaccessibility of operations from refineries or processing centers;
and the provision of living accommodations, food and amenities for
the vast number of people who often suddenly deploy to isolated
locations.4.3. The rise of national oil and gas companies, large independents
and service companies alongside the supermajors provides both
competitive challenges and collaborative opportunities, increasing
the complexity of strategic decisions
The rise of national oil and gas companies, large independents and
service companies alongside the supermajors provides both competi-
tive challenges, as well as collaborative possibilities. The characteris-
tics and differences among these entities with regard to access to
strategic focus, resources, technical and non-technical capabilities,
experience with conventional megaprojects vs. unconventional
resource plays, learning, agility, and responsiveness are well-
documented in the literature and are generally acknowledged
throughout the industry [38e40].
One example of such comparisons, consistent with the “dynamic
capabilities” framework, concerns recent research on “clockspeed”
[41e43]. A large-scale study of “time-to-build” of oil and gas facil-
ities worldwide (1996e2005) suggests that firms with faster “clock-
speed” or intrinsic execution speed capabilities have a performance
and valuation advantage [44]. Firms in faster clockspeed industries
are encouraged to design and assemble assets as well as their supply,
distribution and alliance networks to gain a series of temporary
competitive advantages [45]. Exxon, Shell and Chevron are identified
as firm-level “clockspeed” leaders in their set of 6 IOC supermajors;
ENI, ONGC and StatOil in their set of 6 public-private partnerships
(NOCs) using the proxies of workflow speed, improvement of risk and
portfolio value accrual [41].
Increasing strategic complexity for managers, however, is the
fact that within their own bucket, the NOCs, IOCs and In-
dependents are not homogeneous. The diversity of size, geology,
accessibility, strategic focus, and operational competence within
and among these upstream entities creates a great deal of
complexity in managing both competitive and collaborative in-
teractions. For example, among NOCs, some are essentially politi-
cally entities that lack technical expertise and exhibit low labor
and capital efficiency; while others are very sophisticated direct
competitors of the supermajors, who compete for positions, and
explore and produce oil and gas outside their own borders. Most
NOC’s cannot exist without creating partnerships; others are
A. Shuen et al. / Energy Strategy Reviews 3 (2014) 5e1310blocking entry or expelling competitors to further their economic or
political interests.6
A given Supermajor, therefore, cannot have a strategy for dealing
with the National Oil Companies or with the large Independents, per se,
but must simultaneously develop a number of strategic approaches
related to the nature and character of interactions with particular
NOCs around the world, with specific Independents, with Service Pro-
viders and with other Supermajors, depending on what they need and
where they want to operate.
Given the strategic impact of the rise of the NOCs, large In-
dependents and Service Providers, all entities now need to be more
aware and nimble in relation to the interests and abilities of particular
competitors. In some cases, this may mean that responsibility for
strategy development and execution should be decentralized, and
given to managers with strong knowledge of a particular region or
country. One way or the other, “local” knowledge needs to be brought
to the attention of those responsible for strategic decisions.
In all cases, active management of a cluster of activities is needed
to gather intelligence and manage partnerships (build and manage or
dissolve) with an increasing number of powerful competitors. The rise
of the NOCs and large Independents alongside the majors makes these
capabilities both important and complex.4.4. Managing the human resource strategy in its parts and
interactions
A fundamental challenge for all Oil and Gas companies involves
managing a cluster of human resource activities that provide enough
people (capacity; recruitment; resourcing), who are doing the right
things (technical competence; safety; learning and development), in
the right role, with the right people (teams), in the right seat and
place, at the right time (deployment), with the right supervision
(management), all headed in the right direction (strategy and leader-
ship). Deficiencies in the ways people are managed, alone and in their
interactions, can undermine value creation, production, create di-
sasters, and demolish a strategy.
 For the foreseeable future, capacity in E&P is challenged by a
decreasing and aging geoscience talent pool. Given current trends,
for the next 20 years, the supply of geoscientists will not meet the
demand for geoscientists [46].
 Traditional organizational support structures (HR; Learning and
Development; Recruitment; Deployment) may not be aligned with
the strategic requirements of the Ventures/Projects. In some
companies, “The tail is wagging the dog!”
 There are often acute deficiencies related to learning and cross-
generational mentoring, particularly related to capabilities for
highly complex and high value ventures (e.g., Unconventionals).7
 A large portion of a company’s talent resources may be contractors
who are (understandably) not properly aligned with the company’s
culture, processes and strategy.6 One of the key factors driving change and uncertainty in this industry is the unstable
and often hostile political environment in many oil and gas producing host countries. In
this article, where the focus is on competitive and collaborative advantage derived by
dynamic capabilities, we unfortunately give short shrift to the literature on non-market
strategies, the difficulties of managing government-business relationships in the oil and
gas industry and the issues of rent extraction connected to political power and entities
such as NOCs that have non-market mandates or non-financial/economic incentives. We
do address this briefly in the Feiler and Teece case study, also in this volume, in the
discussion of a dynamic capability that effectively manages the centralized-
decentralized polarity in multinational oil and gas companies.
7 In the Feiler and Teece case study, which is the companion piece to this article in
this volume, we identify learning and cross-generational mentoring as a dynamic
capability implemented by Supermajor EXP. Deployment within the organization is not aligned with strategic
priorities. Other priorities take precedence over getting the Ven-
tures, with highest or potentially highest economic value, the
human resources they need.
 Strategic investment decisions about what to drill need to be
connected to an analysis of current organizational capability. A
particular project or venture may have high-potential economic
value, but may not be doable given the level of technical
competencies or available human assets. Many firms do not ask
the “doability” question when making strategic decisions about
investments.
A focus inside the organization alone as the context for resolving
human resource challenges ignores systemic solutions available in the
company’s business ecosystem: partnerships with service companies,
joint ventures, the use of contractors, etc. As we will explain, dynamic
capabilities that empower people strategy lead to a better manage-
ment of a cluster of activities inside and outside the organization that
recruit, train, and retain the talent required to create value (see Feiler
and Teece, Case Study in this issue).
4.5. Managing health, safety, security and environmental risks
throughout the business ecosystem
On April 20, 2010, an explosion and subsequent fire on the Deep-
water Horizon semi-submersible Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU),
killed 11 workers and injured 16 others. The unit was owned and
operated by Transocean, which was drilling for BP in the Macondo
Prospect oil field about 40 miles (60 km) southeast of the Louisiana
coast. The explosion caused the Deepwater Horizon to burn and sink,
triggering a massive offshore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. This envi-
ronmental disaster is now considered the second largest in U.S. history,
behind the Dust Bowl [47]. Not only was the explosion disastrous for
Transocean, BP and Cameron International, it also led to severe criti-
cism of the oil and gas industry as a whole and curtailment of drilling
operations in the Gulf of Mexico.
Many factors contributed to the disaster [48]. Together they indi-
cate that the management of health, safety, security and environ-
mental (HSSE) risks requires attention and asset orchestration activities
not only throughout the organization but also in the wider business
ecosystem. This kind of management task differs from other kinds of
risk management, such as regulatory or compliance risk, where point-
of-risk solutions may be adequate. Since the origins of these risks are
complex, since the impacts of these risks cross boundaries of the or-
ganization, involving partners to whom key operational activities are
outsourced, and since the impacts of these risks simultaneously affect
several drivers of economic value, not just for one company but for all
E&P companies, a comprehensive, systemic, cultural and strategic
capability around HSSE must be developed and applied by firms seeking
longer term survival, growth, and prosperity.
5. The relevance of the dynamic capabilities framework for
upstream strategy
The Dynamic Capabilities Framework was developed to enhance
strategic agility in high-tech firms operating in high-velocity markets.
While there are clear differences between the strategic foci of high-
tech firms and E&P Oil and Gas companies, and in their business envi-
ronments, in both, leaders are confronting global industry shifts. They
must generate and implement organizational and managerial in-
novations, both internally and within their ecosystems, to capture
opportunities, overcome challenges, mitigate risks and achieve and
sustain competitiveness. Both involve increasing supply in the face of
increasing demand; managing and responding to competition from new
entrants; deploying new technologies; managing challenges related to
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and of the centralized-decentralized polarity in multinational contexts
[49]. These challenges are not entirely unique to oil and gas; accord-
ingly, we see insights gained from the application and testing of this
model in other industries to be relevant for upstream oil and gas
entities.In this section we illustrate the applicability of the Dynamic
Capabilities Framework to Upstream E&P by describing three dynamic
capabilities that we consider to be particularly important for the in-
dustry today.
5.1. Dynamic capability: ambidexterity across mature and emerging
domains
In shifting business environments, inertia kills companies. The
ability to learn, adapt and reconfigure assets and foundational capa-
bilities creates sustainable value and competitive advantage. One
challenge faced by the supermajors and large NOCs, however, is that,
in the current business environment, both mature ventures (e.g.,
heartlands and deep water) and new opportunities (e.g., Un-
conventionals) are strategically important. How do leaders reconfigure
assets to compete simultaneously in both mature and emerging busi-
nesses? O’Reilly and Tushman [50,51] use the term “ambidexterity” to
describe the particular dynamic capability that involves a leader’s
cognitive and behavioral ability to establish, align and sustain the
competencies, structures and cultures that, on the one hand, forward
the interests of the mature business, while, on the other hand, drive
innovation.
The competencies, structures and cultures that lead to success in
mature vs. emerging businesses are different and sometimes contra-
dictory [51,52]. Success in mature businesses requires control, effi-
ciency, replicable processes, increased productivity and reduced
variance. Success in emerging businesses requires autonomy, innova-
tion, search and discovery and embracing variation. Ambidextrous
leaders simultaneously promote both, establishing separate organiza-
tional entities, business models, processes, systems, and cultures for
each, while holding them together through unified strategic intent,
common values and linking mechanisms to leverage assets.
In the brief history of the exploration and production of Uncon-
ventional resources, the major oil and gas companies have had to catch
up with the independents that discovered and developed fracking
technology (e.g., Mitchell Energy, now Devon). Many of the super-
majors had fine-tuned their capabilities and organizational structures
for megaprojects e huge reserves in deep-water locations or other
international locations. Such capabilities, however, are not optimal for
the development of Unconventional resources. By 2011, however,
several of the major oil and gas companies had caught up and surpassed
most of the independents. Of the 14,000þ US oil and gas companies, 10
account for 33% of natural gas production. At the head of the list is
ExxonMobil with BP, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips also in the top 10 [53].
The dynamic capability that engenders competitiveness for the
majors in this new business environment involves being dexterous
across several domains: mature and emerging ventures, rejuvenation
of the heartlands, deep water, capturing the best positions in the
boutique basins (where the independents play), new frontiers (e.g.,
Arctic) and Unconventionals. Separate organizational units, with
dedicated financial, human and technological resources can be created
to capture each of these opportunities, while ensuring that processes
are established to link these sub-units in value-creating ways. To
accomplish this, resources are allocated away from mature ventures
into emerging ones, which requires rapid learning throughout the or-
ganization and its subunits and the outsourcing of jobs to service
companies or contractors. Joint ventures with experienced uncon-
ventional producers both accelerate learning and expand operations.
Finally, leaders need to promote a culture that balances the central-
ized and decentralized parts of the organization. This facilitatescompetitive intelligence-gathering, helps track technological change,
effectively identifies new opportunities, and promotes operational
flexibility and shared values across the organization.5.2. Dynamic capability: the ability to manage the upstream
business ecosystem
Ecosystem management is a dynamic capability essential for
ongoing success. The need to increase production, the fact that
approximately 90% of the reserves are owned by the NOCs, the
decreasing pool of technical experts, the broad range of technical
expertise needed for operations, the need to rapidly deploy new
technologies, the need to work in locations that are remote or political
unstable, all challenge the tradition vertically-integrated E&P firm. A
deep understanding and management of the E&P business ecosystem
and adeptness with partnering strategies are critical for the manage-
ment of upstream entities. Nowhere are the strategic management and
orchestration skills of leaders tested more than they are managing
ecosystem relationships.
This dynamic capability involves the work of developing and
communicating strategy and achieving strategic alignment, managing
expansion through tradition M&A activity, expanding the use of con-
tractors, vendors and joint ventures with companies and governments
(both rivals and complementors), building relationships with service
companies, suppliers, universities, research centers, financial in-
stitutions, regulatory and standards bodies, governments and the
judiciary, and doing all this constantly and simultaneously in many
regions around the world. Moreover, closer attention to upstream and
downstream linkages is increasingly important. E&P companies pay
attention to the marketability of potential supplies when making in-
vestment decisions; this requires close attention to pipelines and other
forms of transportation. This is positively critical in gas, where the
absence of a pipeline (or other means of transportation) may deny the
producer commercial opportunities.
Ecosystem management touches on several important drivers of
economic value:
(1) Strategy formation. When developing strategy at all levels of the
organization, mastery of the knowledge-gathering activities that
keep leaders abreast of developments in the various parts of the
business ecosystem is essential [15]. Knowledge of market condi-
tions, regulations and standards in the geographies where the firm
works or wants to work, supplier and vendor innovations and other
information created by tapping the business ecosystem increases
the ability of leaders to shape opportunities and mitigate risks.
(2) Management of joint ventures. Opportunities to join resources,
assets, capital, and technical expertise are catalysts for collabo-
rative approaches to large projects or ventures. In parallel with
continued high oil prices, advances in technology and the rise of
unconventional exploration and development, the number of joint
ventures is increasing. Joint ventures are the preferred strategy
for NOCs wanting access to US shale plays. In 2013, Sinochem
(China) entered into a $1.7B JV with Pioneer Natural Resources for
a shale play in West Texas. According to the Energy Information
Administration [54], since 2008 foreign companies have estab-
lished 21 JVs with US operators related to tight oil and shale gas
plays. Independents are also partnering more vigorously with the
majors. Not only are the numbers of JVs increasing, but today
there are many more options for collaborations than in the past:
partnerships between private equity funds and upstream com-
panies; small and large independents with the majors; IOCs and
NOCs worldwide are creating JVs to enter the US market. Many
studies show a high failure rate [55]. Strongmanagement is needed
to realize value [56,57].
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part of the investment portfolio of upstream entities: 22-59% of
Supermajor production is operated by others [58]. Worldwide, 23%
of equity production is delivered through non-operated ventures,
with the figure rising above 50% in some regions. Often non-
operating partners do not manage NOVs with the same diligence
as their operated ventures, resulting in significant exposure to risk
and a failure to realize the potential value in the venture. BP’s
non-operating partners at Macondo (2010) were exposed to huge
liabilities and in turn exposed BP to liabilities. According to Whit-
taker and Young [58], E&P companies that are effective at realizing
value from their NOVs treat them as they would the ventures they
operate. Management structures should provide oversight; stra-
tegic managers should focus on four “building blocks”: (a) clear
strategic intent about what each NOV asset contributes to broader
company goals; (b) sharp risk and opportunity assessment; (c)
consistent NOV organization and governance; and (d) rigorous
execution strategies for each NOV asset.
(4) Acquiring technical capabilities. The growth of oilfield service
companies has brought an increase in outsourcing, including many
activities that might once have been considered “core”, such as
production operations [59]. Mining the business ecosystem for
technical capabilities is at the critical for venture success. Essen-
tial to adequate staffing of high potential ventures is organiza-
tional agility in identifying, onboarding and managing contractors,
delegating through contractual relationships projects or parts of
projects to services companies and entering into joint ventures.
Also, as M&A activity ramps up, in part, to increase organizational
capability, strategic managers are increasing dependent on the
ecosystem, particularly where it exists apart from the center of
the organization, to aid in the identification of potential targets
and the provision of organizational and strategic due diligence.
(5) Development and deployment of new technologies. Where does an
E&P company find new technologies? In house R&D is one compo-
nent of a relevant search. In fast-paced environments, however,
often new product introductions benefit from access to external
sources of know-how [52]. Enterprises must search the core as well
as the periphery of their business ecosystem for relevant new
technology. The search must scan both rivals and potential col-
laborators e customers, suppliers, complementors, and new en-
trants e that are active in innovative activity [15].85.3. Dynamic capability: management of health, safety, security
and environmental (HSSE) considerations in the multinational
corporation and throughout the business ecosystem
In Section 4.4 above, we established that the management of
health, safety, security and environmental (HSSE) risks requires
managerial attention spanning the organization and its affiliations.
Since the origins of these risks are complex, since the impacts of these
risks cross boundaries of the organization, involving partners to whom
key operational activities are outsourced, and since the impacts of
these risks can be catastrophic, simultaneously affecting several
drivers of economic value, not just for one company but for all E&P8 In fact, it has long been the case that across industries and time, new entrants have
been responsible for a substantial share of revolutionary products and processes: the jet
engine (Whittle in England; Henkel and Junkers in Germany), catalytic cracking in pe-
troleum refining (Houdry), the electric typewriter (IBM), electronic computing (IBM),
electrostatic copying (Haloid), PTFE vascular grafts (WL Gore), the microwave oven
(Raytheon), and diet cola (RC Cola). This is also the case in oil and gas. In 1997, Mitchell
Energy’s engineers discovered how to effectively fracture shale. Their innovation is
today changing the world.companies, a comprehensive, systemic, cultural and strategic capa-
bility around HSSE must be developed and used.
Today, top E&P firms pay serious attention to managing HSSE, not
only for their own workers but also for all those in their ecosystem who
touch their operations. One large oilfield service company executive
recently credited his ecosystem relationships (e.g., tribal leaders, the
CIA, former Navy Seals), with the efficient and safe extraction over 200
company workers, who had been trapped in Libya in 2010 when NATO
bombing commenced.
Most upstream companies have large HSSE departments staffed by
top leaders, responsible for managing the cluster of activities that
protect people and the environment. CEOs make HSSE a part of every
speech and every report. In some large E&P companies, discussions
about HSSE begin every meeting. Certainly sustaining HSSE has a clear
business purpose. Leaders understand that accidents increase regula-
tion, hurt business performance and decrease the value of the com-
pany’s and the industry’s goodwill. There is an increasing personal
commitment to the importance of this issue throughout the industry
that contradicts stereotypes.
Most oil executives realize that there is no room for complacency.
They understand that with increased production, increased M&A ac-
tivity, certain levels of inexperience with Unconventionals, combined
with geo-political uncertainties, the risks are omnipresent. Managerial
orchestration of resources that create effective Health, Safety, Secu-
rity and Environmental (HSSE) performance is increasingly complex and
a strategic imperative for upstream companies.6. Conclusion
A dynamic capability is a meta-process that involves orchestration
and leadership across a cluster of activitiese resources, processes, and
best practices e to manage comprehensively and systemically, some-
thing that is strategically critical. Dynamic capabilities empower and
make precise decisions about direction, they align stakeholders,
engender readiness for change, and theyincrease agility for capturing
value and for risk mitigation.
We began by describing how new opportunities and challenges
within the upstream industry have created an inflection point that
requires a transformative approach to strategy and strategic manage-
ment. Capturing and producing new oil and gas resources is compli-
cated by increased competition, new technologies that open up
unconventional plays, the rise of NOCs, large Independents and service
companies. Meanwhile, a decrease in global geoscience and engi-
neering talent pools, the need to manage post-Macondo risks, pressure
toward alternative sources of energy, complicate short term as well as
long term decisions.
We have outlined the Dynamic Capabilities Framework to show how
it has evolved from a strategic model employed by high-tech companies
to undergird agility in high-velocity markets, to a comprehensive
strategic framework relevant for upstream oil and gas entities as they
capture opportunities and manage risks in the changing business
environment. Strong Dynamic capabilities can sharpen strategic agility
and are the key to seizing and profiting from opportunities in the new
business environment. Dynamic capabilities empower upstream
strategy.Acknowledgements
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